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This paper explores the territorial dimension of local security policies, with reference to the “Security Pacts” signed
in Italy between 2007 and 2009. These Security Pacts are an innovative instrument introduced by the central
government, aimed at changing the model of security governance at the local level. After describing how Security
Pacts have spread, and which institutional actors have participated in them, this study aims at deepening the
analysis of their territorial dimension. More specifically, the research question at the basis of this study focuses on
the identification of factors that can explain why the pacts feature variations in numbers and types of public
administration at different levels, and why they tend to acquire particular spatial configurations rather than others.
Three hypotheses are tested based on empirical data (obtained using a Quantitative Narrative Analysis with the aid
of Geographic Information Systems and other statistical tools) used to identify which variable may best explain the
propensity to use such pacts to solve security-related issues in different areas of the country.
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The security issue is one of the core themes of the public
discourse in so-called “full-grown democracies” (Hughes
et al. 2002), and it is closely connected to both the trends
in types of crimes and the responses from public (govern-
mental, administrative, judicial, penal) authorities on this
social issue (Dei Delitti e Delle Pene 2002; Morlino et al.
2013; Pajno 2010). It is also influenced by the perception
that people have of both elements (Castels 2003; Simon
2007). In the political market—in particular as far as citi-
zen demand is concerned—an increasingly higher demand
for protection of public order has been recorded over the
last 15 years, requiring more extensive guarantees on per-
sonal safety, better protection against acts of terrorism,
and even demands to be able to live a quality life in condi-
tions of “full security” (Boutellier 2004; Bauman 2005, 2008).
Security has become a real “obsession” (Curbet 2008) that
citizens share, or at least charge to their elected* Correspondence: mcalaresu@uniss.it
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reproduction in any medium, provided the origrepresentatives at all levels of government (Garland 1996,
2001; Hughes and Edwards 2002). On the political offer side,
at the same time, policy platforms developed to meet that
demand and to guarantee a more effective institutional
response to the perception of insecurity voiced by the
people (Lagrange 1993; Baratta 2001; Pavarini 2006b;
Recasens i Brunet 2007; De Micheli and Tebaldi 2013;
Moroni and Chiodelli 2014).
Among the different instruments used to inform such
policies, we assisted to the spread of contractualization
practices (Gaudin 1996, 1999; Lascoumes and Le Galés
2004), to be considered as “one of the most significant pro-
cesses of political-administrative change”a (Bobbio 2000:
112) in contemporary democracies. Through such prac-
tices, policies are defined and implemented on different
subjects, purposes, stakeholders, territorial scalesb or scopes
of action. In practice, they may generally be regarded as
explicit agreements on matters of public interest,c submit-
ted in written form, in which the parties declare publicly
to approve a plan or course of action, or mutual commit-
ments; putting their own resources (not necessarily. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
mmons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
inal work is properly credited.
Figure 1 Configuration of institutional actors involved in the
Security Pacts signed with the prefectures. Source: Own
data processing.
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when and how to implement this (Bobbio 2000).
Italy is no exception with regard to the above-mentioned
contractualization processes. The topic of urban and local
security, although emerging later than in the UK and
France (Braccesi 2005: 25; Selmini 2005a: 15–16), was de-
veloped in Italy by institutional reforms in the late 1990s
(Amendola 2003; Mazzette 2003a; Selmini 2004, 2005b;
Braccesi and Selmini 2005; Pavarini 2006a). However,
since 2005, the relations of cooperation and collaboration
between state institutions, regional and local authorities in
the field of security have been institutionalized through
the signing of new agreements (Calaresu 2012, 2013),
designed to overcome the weaknesses of the previous
inter-institutional cooperation model as tested during the
so-called “first contractual season” (1998–2005)d. On
March 20th, 2007e, a framework agreement on the security
of urban areas was signed between the then Minister of
Home Affairs Giuliano Amato, ANCI President Leonardo
Domenici, and the mayors of the metropolitan cities
(Governo Italiano - Ministero dell’Interno 2007)f. The
National Pact was designed to initiate—within sixty
days—as many agreements as possible within the
framework of a relationship of subsidiarity between
public bodies and regional and local administrations.
Legislative decree No. 92, formalized on September
13th, 2008 with the drafting of another agreement between
the National Association of Small Municipalities (ANPCI)
and the Ministry of Home Affairs (Law no. 125 of 2008),
extends the application of “coordinated plans of territorial
control”, and the strengthening of logistics and instrumen-
tal and financial collaboration between state and local au-
thorities, provided for by the 2007 Finance Act, to small
and medium-sized entities; selecting groups of municipal-
ities where the pacts could be implemented (Governo
Italiano – Ministero dell’Interno 2008).
The dates reported above mark the days when the
“second contractual season” started (2007–2009). The
new generation instruments paved the way for a model
of security governance different from the previous one,
and based on which local administrations seem to be
granted the capability to acquire more powers and respon-
sibilities with regard to urban and local security (Martin
and Selmini 2000; Calaresu and Padovano 2011). These
“Security Pacts” pursue the objective of collaboration
between central and peripheral bodies, through the devel-
opment of an integrated security system; with tasks and
responsibilities distributed among different governance
levels (Calaresu 2012). In an attempt to start new forms of
cooperation between the central government and the local
level, the pacts provide a two-fold additional function. On
the one hand, they bind prefectures, the peripheral bodies
of the central government, to agree to promote certain
activities with regional and local authorities, and to sharetheir information. On the other hand, they redistribute
responsibilities within the prevention and control
functions, allowing local police to cooperate in the fields
of prevention and repression with national-level services.
Between 2007 and 2009, 51 Security Pacts were signed
in Italy. The only actor that is always present when sign-
ing a pact is the prefecture (an agency managed directly
by the Ministry of Home Affairs) that signs the agreement
with the Municipality, the Province, and the Region, thus
generating different institutional configurations (Figure 1).
The municipalities are the main actor involved in the
signing of the pacts with the prefectures. Indeed, only
on one occasion did the provincial authority sign the
agreement without involving the municipality (or more
municipalities). The synergy between the municipality
and the province is the most widely used—40% of the
cases—higher than the agreements signed by a single
municipality or a group of municipalities with the prefec-
ture (30%). The full institutional configuration, involving
all local authorities (region, province(s) and municipality
(s)) is the least common, being perhaps the most difficult
to obtain owing to the large number of institutional actors
involved in the agreement.
Case description: where have the “Security Pacts”
been signed? A preliminary analysis on the
geographical areas
The 51 analysed Security Pacts are not evenly distributed
throughout the territoryg. As the image below suggests
(Figure 2), the pacts are mostly used in the North West
(39.22%) and North East (23.53%) of Italy. Overall, the
North (62.75%) had the highest score in comparison with
the South (11.76%), and even more so with respect to the
Islands (5.88%). Even adding the latter share with the
percentages obtained from the South and the Centre of
the peninsula, the percentage of pacts in the south turns
out to be only slightly higher than half (37.25%) of the
total of the northern regions (62.75%).
Figure 2 Distribution of Security Pacts by region. Source: Drafted using ISTAT demographic data.
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have been involved in the drafting and implementation
of Security Pacts. However, by paying attention to their
spatial distribution, on the basis of their belonging to a
specific demographic group, data intended simply to show
the percentage of the total number of signing municipal-
ities, is information that may be misleading (Figure 3).
This is because, with respect to the common conception
of security as a typical issue of large conurbations and
metropolitan areas, 45% of the signatories are small and
very small-sized Italian municipalities; that is, with a max-
imum number of 5000 inhabitants.
The data do become more interesting when the add-
itional 25% is added that includes the share of munici-
palities ranging between 5001 and 15,000 inhabitants
(70% of the total number of municipalities). From this
perspective, larger cities do not seem to be particularly
interested in contractualizing security policies. TheirFigure 3 Distribution of Security Pacts by demographic size
and relative share of municipalities with Pacts. Source: Processed
using ISTAT demographic data.involvement does not exceed 5% of the total number of
signed pacts (Calaresu and Padovano, 2011: 89). How-
ever, when the percentage of pacts signed out of the
total number of signing municipalities is considered, the
result is just the opposite (Figure 4).
Local administrative entities exceeding 250,000 inhabi-
tants contributed 83.3% of the total pacts (in other words,
10 municipalities out of 12 of the same class), while small-
sized towns did not exceed 1.9% of the total number of
Italian municipalities in this category (112 municipalities
out of 5739). Table 1 depicts both variables (geographical
area and demographic range), providing information on
the distribution of the 241 signatory municipalities within
the five geographical macro-areas of interest: North West,
North East, Centre, South and the Islands.
In the North West, nearly 90% of the signatory muni-
cipalities are reported to be small or very small in size
(less than 15,000 inhabitants), but there is a widespread
distribution of pacts in the area. While in the South, theFigure 4 Distribution of Security Pacts by demographic size
and relative share of municipalities of the same category.
Source: Processed using ISTAT demographic data.
Table 1 Distribution of Security Pacts by geographical area and demographic size of the municipalities with Pacts
Constituency Up to 5000 5001-15000 15001-50000 50001-100000 100001-250000 Over 250000 Total
North West 67,97% 19,53% 3,91% 5,47% 0,78% 2,34% 100%
North East 19,51% 39,02% 24,39% 2,44% 7,32% 7,32% 100%
Centre 21,05% 23,68% 36,84% 5,26% 7,89% 5,26% 100%
South 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 33,33% 33,33% 33,33% 100%
Islands 24,14% 41,38% 13,79% 13,79% 3,45% 3,45% 100%
Source: Processed using ISTAT demographic data.
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the pacts turned out to be only three in number; all of
them being large-sized (between 50,000 and 250,000+).
Discussion and evaluation: the geographical
configurations of the “Security Pacts”
Data and methods: from words to numbers (and maps)
After analysing the background data, the discussion covers
empirically relevant aspects connected to the dependent
variable being taken into account, that is, the aspects that
make it possible to understand the Security Pacts signed
in Italy between 2007 and 2009h. The goal is to under-
stand the geographical configurations of these pacts.
Based on the linguistic and textual characteristics of the
afore-mentioned documentsi , which may be considered
as a “narrative” text, Quantitative Narrative Analysis
(QNA) methodology was implemented (Franzosi 2004,
2010). Narrative is a text genre with distinct, perhaps in-
variant, structural characteristics as follows: 1) chrono-
logically ordered sequences of events, 2) actors doing
“things” to the benefit or detriment of other actors, as typ-
ically rendered linguistically by the simple structure SVO,
Subject-Verb-Object, a structure also known as “story
grammar” (an invariant structure of narrative approxi-
mately corresponding to the 5 W’s of journalism—Who,
What, When, Where, Why—with the potential addition of
several more elements); and 3) The number of steps in
these sequences is limited and invariant within specific
narrative types (Franzosi 2004).
QNA is an approach that allows structuring the narra-
tive information contained in documents with the pur-
pose of collecting data into a “story grammar”. Security
Pacts are indeed characterized by a Subject-Verb-Object
structure (SVO). The signing actors (institutional bodies
such as the prefect’s offices, the municipalities, the regions)
mutually commit (or engage other operators, such as the
police forces) to achieve objectives (training activities, co-
operation, organization…), through specific actions, mostly
of a relational nature (coordination, communication, fund-
ing, and so on), in a given action space. In a nutshell,
QNA, through its “rewrite rules” (Franzosi 2010: 24), al-
lows the encoding of the “events” (Rimmon-Kenan 1983:
2) that are present in the source text, and sets them withinan organizational structure consisting of narrative and
non-narrative data. Using software specifically designed
for this task, PC-ACEj, a relational database system was
generated (07_SecuPacts_09). More specifically, the re-
lational properties of the database made it possible to
convert words into numbers (Franzosi 2004). All the avail-
able information contained in the database was then
exported (via Structured Query Language) and analysed,
for the purpose of this paperk, with the aid of Geographic
Information Systems (ArcGIS)l software, and by means of
SPSSm. ArcGIS software describes the relationships be-
tween the stakeholders and related spatial data, on the
basis of their common geographical frame of reference. In
this study, the maps highlight the spatial distribution of
Security Pacts.
The coding of the 51 Security Pacts under study—with
a total of 487 pages of documents (and 2671 performed
“semantic triplets”n)—involved 11,652,444 inhabitants;
distributed in 241 municipalities. Of these municipalities,
31 are provincial capital cities (11 in the North West, 7 in
the North East, 7 in the Centre, 3 in the South and 3 on
the Islands) out of a total of 103, that is 30% of the totalo.
As a first result of the GIS analysis of pacts, Figure 5
shows the association of each pact signed on an area with
a specific institutional configuration. However, despite the
fact that the municipality/province/region configuration is
the least common from a numeric point of view, the map
suggests that the dissemination of this combination is
connected to strategic and wider areas (such as, the cities
of Rome, Genoa, Bari, Bologna, Venice, Florence and
Perugia). Figure 6 reports on the distribution of the signa-
tory municipalities within Italy, providing a detailed de-
scription of the geographical and institutional boundaries
of the local authorities engaged in these pacts. Figures 7
and 8 show the geographical position of the 28 provincial
governments and seven regional entities that undersigned
the pacts.
Why there? Three hypotheses on security localization
This section focuses on the identification of the reasons
why local administrations in different areas of the country
tend to use pacts as instruments to solve security-related
issues. In particular, it focuses on the analysis of the
Figure 5 Institutional configuration of Security Pacts. Source: Own data processing. Image: ArcGis.
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cific geographical configurations; namely to adjust this se-
curity tool based on specific spatial and administrative
boundaries, and with specific goals. Three hypotheses
were constructed for empirical testing:
Hypothesis 1: The specific territorial configurations of Se-
curity Pacts depend on the political colour of the majority
party or majority coalition running local institutions. A
pact is the result of specific policy choices connected tothe will of the political parties involved, and tends to occur
whenever the institutions that initiate it have the same
political affiliation.
Hypothesis 2: Regardless of their political colour, the
spatial configuration of the Security Pacts depends on
the size and demographic density of urban areas. The
most densely populated regions tend to be those with
the highest concentration of criminal acts, and therefore,
they require institutional arrangements to combat the
Figure 6 Municipalities with Security Pacts. Source: Own data processing. Image: ArcGis.
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pacts acquire specific spatial configurations, since such
configurations are the most likely institutional response to
the geo-localization of crime.
Hypothesis 3: Regardless of their political colour, range,
demographic density and the resulting geo-localization of
crime, Security Pacts are connected to specific territories
and their social and economic features, and are character-
ized by high levels of wellbeing and the quality of life of
their inhabitants.Do politics matter? “Security Pacts” and the connotation
of the political majority
This section aims at testing the first hypothesis: that is,
the one identifying the political colour of governments
at different levels as the independent variable determin-
ing the localization of the use of Security Pacts. First, we
should ask ourselves whether pacts (as a whole, regard-
less of the number of local and regional signing parts)
had a specific political connotation, whether they were
implemented mostly by the right-centre or left-centre
Figure 7 Provinces with Security Pacts. Source: Own data processing. Image: ArcGis.
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data extracted from the Registry of Local and Regional
Directors - Department of Internal and Territorial Affairs
of the Ministry of Home Affairs, each administration in-
volved was labelled as right-centre, left-centre, and otherp
based on the affiliation of the mayor, and/or the President
of the region or the province, who signed the pact at the
time of their electionq. By summing up the different posi-
tions, including the political connotation of the national
government at the time of signing, each pact was labelledas homogeneous or mixed. Homogeneous meaning that
within the pact each administration involved belonged to
the same political area, resulting in the presence of a pre-
vailing orientation (right-centre or left-centre). Conversely,
mixed refers to the absence of such political orientation.
Inhomogeneous is reported when at least one of the con-
tracting actors belonged to a political area different from
the rest of the signatories. Figure 9 shows the results of
the above-mentioned process: interestingly, the pacts do
not show any particular political connotation. The
Figure 8 Regions with Security Pacts. Source: Own data processing. Image: ArcGis.
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seem to belong to a specific political area, while a slightly
higher number (39%) of mixed pacts is reported.
Keeping the single pact as the reference unit of measure,
it is possible to identify connections between the political
colour of the pacts and their national geographical distri-
bution by macro-area. Most interestingly, in the North
West of the country, 60% of the pacts were signed by
right-centre political majorities, including the nationalgovernment in charge at the time of the agreement. This is
almost certainly due to the greater spread of right-centre
administrations in this area, with respect to the national
total, as well as the greater presence of small and very
small-sized municipalities in the region (with respect to
the national total). However, since consolidated data are
not available, it is not possible to confirm this relationship.
If the unit of reference changes, moving from a single
pact to the 241 municipalities involved in the signing
Figure 9 Political connotation of Security Pacts. Out of a total number of 51 documents, based on the signatory administrations and the
national government. Source: Own processing of the data extracted from the Register of Local and Regional Directors - Department of Internal
and Territorial Affairs of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
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total of 57% of the signatory municipalities belong to the
mixed group, while the right-centre and left-centre mu-
nicipalities share the remaining pie (Figure 10). This is a
result of the fact that 45% of the municipalities involved
in Security Pacts are small and very small-sized munici-
palities (see Figures 3 and 4), where the so-called civic
lists or independent groups are widespread, as well as the
personal parties, which may not be labelled as either
left-wing or right-wing.
This picture changes when the institutional configur-
ation associated with the political connotation of the pacts
is taken into account, based on the mixed-homogeneous
political connotation process described above (Table 2).
The data show that, taking into account the full institu-
tional configuration—an agreement is reached between
the local authorities (region, provinces and municipalities)
together with the prefectures—75% of the pacts were fi-
nalized by left-centre administrations, with the presence
of a national government of the same political affiliation.
Conversely, right-centre administrations did not manage
to obtain the same results (0%). Keeping in mind that the
full configuration was the least common (Table 2), being
perhaps the most difficult to obtain due to the large num-
ber of institutional actors involved in the agreement, it
can be seen that the contracting left-centre stakeholdersFigure 10 Connotation of the political majority of the municipality an
signatory municipalities, regardless of the affiliation of the national governm
of Local and Regional Directors - Department of Internal and Territorial Affawere the most effective in reaching an agreement on a
shared medium to long-term project, or at least they were
more likely to reach such agreement than those belonging
to the right-centre area, including a large number of insti-
tutional actors. However, right-centre administrations re-
lied on the collaboration between the municipality and the
province (52.3%), excluding the region.
Size of population, demographic density and “Security
Pacts”. Which kind of relationship?
This section is dedicated to the empirical test of the second
hypothesis. This hypothesis emphasizes the correlation be-
tween demographic density, the probability of criminal be-
haviour, and the need for the government to implement
Security Pacts to combat the social disadvantage that crime
generates.
The analysis focuses on the pacts signed in the cities of
Milan, Varese and the Como Lake area. The use of such
instruments, as Figure 11 shows, is widespread, since it af-
fects a large number of administrations (89 municipalities),
with different institutional configurations (municipality and
municipalities/provinces). The map shows the institutional
boundaries of the pacts, starting with the “Patto per Milano
sicura” that involve the municipality and the Prefecture
only. Milan appears as a compact city, the capital of a
densely populated province in the centre of a metropolitand signing of the Security Pacts. Out of a total number of 241
ent. Source: Own processing of the data extracted from the Register
irs of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Table 2 Institutional configuration and political connotation of the Security Pacts
Institutional configuration Right-centre Left-centre Mixed tot. % rc % lc % m. tot.
Municipality 6 3 8 17 35,2% 17,6% 47,0% 100%
Municipality/province 11 1 9 21 52,3% 4,7% 42,8% 100%
Municipality/province/region 0 9 3 12 0,0% 75,0% 25,0% 100%
Province 1 0 0 1 - - - 100%
Total 51
Taking into account the national government. Source: Data extracted from the Register of Local and Regional Directors - Department of Internal and Territorial
Affairs of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Figure 11 Distribution of Security Pacts in the areas of Milan, Varese, Como Lake. Source: Own data processing. Image: ArcGis.
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stretches to the North and North East through diffused
urban settlement, reaching the towns of Busto Arsizio and
Gallarate. These cities also signed a security pact, in col-
laboration with the Prefecture of Varese. A little further to
the North, Varese (the capital city of the province) signed
its own pact in agreement with the Prefecture. Turning to
the West, near the Swiss border, the city of Como reached
an agreement with its Province and the Prefecture, as part
of the “Patto per Como sicura” initiative. Around the pro-
vincial capital city, is a sparsely populated area stretches
(i.e. an area with a low ratio between the number of inhab-
itants and the surface area) where the smaller towns (in
some cases with more than 5000 inhabitants), teamed up
to agree on a number of pacts within the same province.
For instance, the municipalities located within the “Como
belt”r mark a safe zone that surrounds the city of Como as
a whole. To the south, three separate covenants (“Patto
locale di sicurezza urbana per l’area Mariano Comense”,
“Patto locale di sicurezza urbana per l’area Canturina”,
“Patto locale di sicurezza urbana per l’area Bassa Comasca”)
involving 35 municipalitiess mark an additional belt
around the city border. The “Patto locale di sicurezza
urbana per l’area Olgiatese” completes the belt around
the city of Como, involving a vast area to the West of
the city, where no municipality exceeds 5000 inhabitantst.
To the North, also the triangle underneath the two
stretches of the Como Lake area is included in a pact
(“Patto locale di sicurezza urbana dell’area Triangolo Lar-
iano”), as the result of the institutional joint initiative of
the Prefecture, the Province of Como, and a multitude of
small-sized municipalities not exceeding 5000 inhabi-
tantsu. This area is characterized by being a part of an area
of privileged conditions in terms of wealth and tourism.
Along the national border, near the Maggiore Lake, an-
other pact area was developed with characteristics similar
to the previous one (“Patto locale di sicurezza urbana per
l’area Lepontine Meridionali”). It is also an area with
deeply rooted historical and environmental values, charac-
terized by the presence of non-urbanized municipalitiesv
(Chiodini and La Nave 2010: 32–33).
What happened in the Milan-Como-Como Lake terri-
tory seems to have had many similarities with that in the
Garda area (Figure 12), as well as in the Florence area
(Figure 13). As Figure 12 shows, the use of pacts in the
Garda area is widespread across a great number of local
administrations (28 municipalities) with different institu-
tional configurations (municipality and municipalities/
provinces). The city of Verona and the city of Brescia,
on the boundaries of the map (Figure 12), confirm the
trend of medium-large cities to agree upon security ar-
rangements directly with the Prefecture, while in the Garda
Lake area, small-sized administrative bodies (in very lowly
populated areas or non-urbanized areas) join and protect aregion characterized by a remarkable quality of natural
landscapes and historical resources, as well as by high con-
centrations of “wealthy” economies (Chiodini and La Nave
2010: 32–33). The “Patto per la sicurezza dell’area del Lago
di Garda” includes an association of municipalities mostly
with less than 5000 inhabitants, within an area that has a
tourist vocation (Chiodini and La Nave 2010: 104), and
high levels of social wellbeing and wealthw. Figure 12
shows that the “Patto per la sicurezza dell’area del Lago di
Garda” signed by the Prefectures of Verona and Brescia
(as well as the Port Authority of Venice) marks a new
cross-provincial institutional border, thanks to the partici-
pation of the Provinces of Brescia, Verona and Trento,
going beyond the traditional administrative partition of
the area.
The same applies to the area of Florence (Figure 13),
starting with the “Patto per la sicurezza dei comuni del
Circondario dell’Empolese Valdelsa”. Signed by 11 local
administrations with the Prefecture of Florence, it covers
an area characterized by low levels of urbanizationx, in a
territory once again characterized by a very high envir-
onmental value, as well as by high levels of social well-
being and wealth (Chiodini and La Nave 2010: 104).
Compared with the cases described above, however, two
peculiar behaviours of local administrations in this area
are to be noted: the city of Prato – “Patto per Prato
sicura”, and the city of Florence – “Patto per Firenze
sicura”, which are medium to large-sized cities as well as
provincial capitals, found it necessary to sign pacts in
addition to the ones with the Prefecture, trying in this
way to enlarge the use of the instrument and the level of
coordination with other local authorities. As far as Prato
is concerned, the pact also involved the Province of
Prato and the Tuscany Regional Authority. However, in
Florence, in addition to the Province and the Region,
several small towns were involvedy in a peripheral area
characterized by a high environmental profile (Chiodini
and La Nave 2010: 38).
Based on the data described in Figures 11, 12 and 13,
it is possible to draw a picture of the contractual behaviour
adopted by the administrations involved in the subscrip-
tion of pacts (2007–2009): 1) as expected, a widespread
use of the pact instrument may be seen in provincial cap-
ital cities, as well as in cities having between 50,000 and
250,000 inhabitants, which serve as local poles of attraction
(Milan, Varese, Gallarate, Busto Arsizio, Como, Brescia,
Verona). This particular administrative level does not seem
to feel the need (with the exception of Florence and Prato)
for an agreement with nearby municipalities, nor with the
provincial or regional authorities, possibly believing that a
single pact undersigned with the Prefecture would be
enough. The high demographic density as well as the so-
cial and economic characteristics of this territory suggest
that these conurbations may suffer from security issues
Figure 12 Distribution of Security Pacts in the Garda area. Source: Own data processing. Image: ArcGis.
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typical of hot suburbs, or neighbourhoods characterized
by urban decay and/or social issues; 2) frequent use of this
instrument is observed among associated small and very
small-sized administrations, located in what Giovanni
Maciocco labels as “empty landscapes”, as opposed toFigure 13 Distribution of Security Pacts in the Florence area. Source: Othose that are “more densely developed” (Maciocco 2007:
30). This solution was explicitly encouraged by Article 17
of Law 128/2001, supplemented by Article 7 of the Law of
May 23rd, 2008, No. 92 (as amended July 24th, 2008, No.
125), which provided for smaller municipalities or an
association thereof to manage in associated form anywn data processing. Image: ArcGis.
Calaresu and Tebaldi City, Territory and Architecture  (2015) 2:1 Page 13 of 18security-related issues. These enjoyed the technical support
of the National ANCI Association –to ensure “an adequate
exercise of municipal powers in matters connected to
law enforcement, in particular to facilitate the en-
hancement of the intervention capacity of local police
in ordinary activities and to facilitate the State Police
Corps, the Carabinieri Legion, and the Guardia di
Finanza in their involvement in crime prevention ac-
tivities, and control of the territory”z (Antonelli 2010:
93–94).
The outcome of this recommendation was not obvious
at all, for three reasons. First, because it was not clear how
each municipality would feel about it. Second, because the
legislation granted the parties involved the freedom to
choose the most appropriate partners to achieve security-
related objectives. Third, because although the association
aimed at “managing security-related issues”, and provided
for generic objectives to be achieved (such as, strengthen-
ing the capacity of local police to deal with ordinary
crime), it was clear that the factors leading the mayors of
small towns such as Castelfiorentino, Fiesole, Desenzano,
Garda, Cusino (just to name a few) to sign a security pact,
could not be the same as those faced by the mayors of
intensely urbanized areasaa such as Milan, Brescia and
Varese. It is therefore necessary to analyse the contractual
behaviours pursued by the contracting authorities to
understand how the individual municipalities have ad-
justed the legislative framework to these aspects; and in
particular, the possible incentives (positive or negative)
which may have brought smaller municipalities to sign an
agreement on security-related matters.
Figures 11, 12 and 13 show how administrations in areas
with a low or very low demographic density, and geo-
graphically far from the regional capital city (Como Lake
area, the areas of Florence, Empoli, Garda Lake) decided
to adopt a security pact, joining together with the Prov-
ince and the Prefecture (more rarely with the regional au-
thority and/or with the capital city of reference, except in
the case of Florence and Prato). As already noted, the
guiding thread connecting all municipalities is their high
historical value, and the high levels of social wellbeing and
wealth of its population. In this sense, Maciocco’s words
(Maciocco 2007: 30) seem to be confirmed by the empir-
ical data: “[…] alternative reference points from the ste-
reotypes of the compact city, refuting the widespread
assumption that the city is the ‘only thing of interest’
[…]”. These data highlight the fact that local govern-
ments put into practice what was suggested by those
sociologists who have studied the connection between
urbanism, urban planning and the institutionsab. They
prove to have enough institutional intelligence to draw
new borders, identifying a security area based on specific
social and economic features, rather than sticking to the
traditional Italian administrative partition (Municipality,Province and Region)ac. In some cases, the new institu-
tional border acquires a cross-provincial (in addition to a
cross-municipal) profile. That is, they are able to go be-
yond the traditional provincial borders (Brescia, Verona
and Trento; Figure 12).
The social and economic features of urban areas and the
use of “Security Pacts”
The third case aims at understanding whether social and
economic wellbeing is to be considered a significant fac-
tor in explaining the propensity to use Security Pacts in
specific areas, and in specific inter-institutional configu-
rations. The three highlights (Milan-Como-Como Lake
area, the area of Benaco, the Florence area) suggest that
there may be some kind of correlation between the Se-
curity Pacts specifically signed by municipal authorities,
and the levels of social wellbeing and wealth of an area.
Other authors have already explored this type of assump-
tion. Battistelli and Lucianetti (2010), for instance, argue
that such high living standards, accompanied by high
levels of economic development, lead to the development
of post-materialistic needs (Inglehart 1996); which in turn
would result in “forms of participation, aesthetics and self-
fulfilment”ad (Battistelli and Lucianetti 2010: 46). This has
the effect of boosting, within the political security market,
both the demand side and the supply side of the security
good. Battistelli and Lucianetti regard Italy as a country
“split in half”ae: the North representing the emergence
of post-materialist needs, such as urban security; while
the South (or rather, the Mezzogiorno) “oppressed by
structural setback”af, cannot meet the citizens’ need for
employment and personal safety.
To formalize this hypothesis, we might say that munici-
palities with a higher level of social wellbeing and wealth
(in this case regardless of their population), are more likely
to use Security Pacts (thus demonstrating a higher security-
related interest); whereas it is expected that the municipal-
ities with a low level of social wellbeing and wealth have a
minor interest towards the same instrument. To test the
validity of this hypothesis, available data (referred to as
pacts signed by municipalities during the years 2007–
2009) were cross-checked with data released by Eurostatag
for the year 2007. These data were relevant to the per
capita gross domestic product (GDP)ah, measured in
terms of Purchasing Power Standards (PPS)ai by macro-
geographical areaaj, ak.
As a result, our initial hypothesis is confirmed in four
out of five cases (Figure 14). The empirical evidence
shows that a high level of income (GDP per capita, PPS)
is connected to the highest percentages of municipalities
signing a security pact during the period under consider-
ation. The North West, where the highest levels of in-
come are reported, also has the highest percentage of
registered pacts. The North East and Central areas are
Figure 14 Percentage of municipalities with Security Pacts and GDP per capita PPS by geographical area. Source: Processing of Eurostat
“Regional GDP per Inhabitant 2007 in the EU27”. Released 18 February 2010 al.Demographic data source: ISTAT. Image: SPSS.
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and the lowest number of pacts signed. The exception is
the Islands (Sicily and Sardinia), which has values similar
to Central Italy as for the percentage of pacts imple-
mented, but rather lower with regard to gross wealth per
capita (GDP-PPS).
The picture is the same if the available data related to
the pacts signed by the municipalities (during the same
period of time) are coupled with another social and eco-
nomic welfare indicator: the quality of life in ItalianFigure 15 Percentage of municipalities with Security Pacts and qualit
from Italia Oggi (2007). Demographic data source: ISTAT. Image: SPSS.municipalities, published on an annual basis by Italia Oggi
(2007)am, an. This value is measured based on seven differ-
ent indicators, to capture different aspects of the social and
economic welfare connected to GDP level: 1) business and
labour; 2) the environment; 3) crime; 4) poverty; 5) ser-
vices; 6) leisure; 7) general. The 7th was used for our test.
The results show that Southern Italy has the lowest level
of social and economic welfare (quality of life) and the low-
est relative share of signatory municipalities. Even using the
general index of quality of life as a measure of wellbeing,y of life index by area. Source: Own processing of data extracted
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top of the Italian rankings, with a higher percentage of Se-
curity Pacts being used (Figure 15). Once again, the excep-
tion is to be found on the Islands: the quality of life index
is the same as in the Southao, but the number of pacts
signed is much higher (with values similar to Central Italy).
Conclusions
Security Pacts are an innovative instrument aimed at
governing security that were particularly popular among
Italian municipalities, provinces and regions between
2007 and 2009. The analysis reported in this paper has
helped us to particularly understand why such pacts ac-
quired specific territorial configurations rather than others,
even to the extent of drawing borders different from insti-
tutionally established administrative boundaries.
The first hypothesis, which assumed a correlation be-
tween the territorial configurations of pacts and the polit-
ical colour of the contracting authorities and the central
government, does not seem to provide a satisfactory ex-
planation for this result. The importance of the political
and ideological cleavage, in particular, seems to be contra-
dicted by the following empirical findings: first, pacts were
signed by both right-wing and left-wing governments and
administrations; second, some pacts were signed by ad-
ministrations of a particular political affiliation and im-
plemented, without substantial changes, by different
administrations; third, some pacts ratified the collabor-
ation between local authorities at different territorial
levels that were not (not all and not always) homoge-
neous in terms of political affiliation.
The second hypothesis, that the population size and
demographic density of the affected areas explain the
spatial configuration of the instrument seems to explain
some, although not all, of the cases related to the pacts
signed in areas characterized by low levels of demographic
density, and the presence of small and very small-sized
municipalities.
In this context, the third explanatory hypothesis gains
more strength, taking the social and economic condi-
tions of the territory as the independent variable. The
data show that a high level of income and quality of life
at the regional and municipal level was connected with a
higher interest in signing pacts.
To explain the causal relationships between the level
of income and quality of life at the regional and munici-
pal level, and the capacity of the wealthier classes to im-
prove policies based on security, a new hypothesis may
be suggested at this stage. The spatial configurations of
pacts may suggest that those communities used Security
Pacts as pre-emptive rather than reactive instruments,
unlike high-density urban communities.
Future research on this variable may therefore verify or
falsify the hypothesis that the wealthier classes (althoughsmaller and isolated in the territory as a community) are
actually able to organize defensive strategies by leveraging
their capacity to organize themselves; starting from the
pre-emptive protection of the territory (thus anticipating
the possible causes of social disadvantage related to
crime), the environment, the level of economic activity,
and the form of living spaces. This ability means that they
are able to overcome ideological barriers, both on the left-
right axis, and in relation to the traditional administrative
boundaries of reference. While it is true that one of the
declared objectives of the introduction of Security Pacts in
Italy was to encourage the production of the security good
in terms of quality of life, we hereby claim that most of
the administrations involved were those in areas that
already enjoyed the highest levels of quality of life. In con-
clusion then, we may assume, for future agenda, that pacts
were mostly used to defend the status quo (and promote
the already safe areas), rather than to fill an existing secur-
ity gap or helping others to cope with security-related
issues.Endnotes
aAuthor translation.
bContracts can be “vertical” if they involve different
levels of government on a different geographic scale,
“horizontal” when they involve different local institutions,
or “functional” if they belong to the same level of gov-
ernance. In several empirical studies the simultaneous
presence of both dimensions was detected (Bobbio 2006:
70, author translation).
cThe first aspect (the nature of the agreements) is func-
tional to allow a distinction to be made between the re-
search topic and the traditional negotiation policies. The
second (matters of public interest such as the content of
the contract) is necessary to make a distinction between a
public contract and a private contract (Bobbio 2000: 113,
author translation).
dFor more details, see Le Galés (1997: 444), Fiasco
(2001: 26–27), Procaccini (2003: 410), Braccesi (2005: 30),
Giovannetti (2009: 131), Antonelli (2010: 87–88), Calaresu
(2013: 61–62).
eOn the basis of Article 439, Paragraph 1 of Italian Law
No. 296/2006 (2007 Financial Act), Prefects are authorized
to enter into agreements with the regions and the local
authorities for the implementation of special programmes.
fBari, Bologna, Cagliari, Catania, Florence, Genoa, Milan,
Naples, Palermo, Rome, Turin.
gThe division is based on the Nomenclature of Territorial
Units for Italian Statistics (NUTS:IT) used for statistical
purposes at the European Union (Eurostat 2008). The
NUTS country codes suggest a subdivision into three
levels: 1) Breakdown by Geographical Areas; 2) Breakdown
by regions; 3) Division based on provincial borders.
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of the first Security Pact) and 31st of December 2009 (the
end of the period under study).
iFor further investigation on this matter see Calaresu
(2013).
jThe Program for Computer-Assisted Coding of Events,
available at www.pc-ace.com, organizes information in a
relational data format, with different text elements stored
in different computer tables in the same database. PC-
ACE does not do the hard work of automatically parsing
text within the categories of a story grammar (Artificial
Intelligence has yet to deliver on early promises of com-
puter understanding of natural languages). All PC-ACE
does (or any other currently available software of textual
analysis, for that matter, except for basic word counts) is
to provide a computerized tool that makes the task of
sorting information within the categories of a “story gram-
mar” easier and more reliable for a human coder.
kFor further information about the empirical results
obtained with the SQL interrogation of the 07_SecuPacts_09
database (with particular reference to the analysis of quali-
tative data via network models and social network ana-
lysis), see Calaresu (2012, 2013).
lArcGIS software is a system that allows the acquisition,
recording, analysis, and visualization of spatial data and in-
formation derived from geographic data (geo-referenced
data).
mIBM SPSS Statistics Software 21, 64 bit. Microsoft Li-
censed version.
nFor a better understanding of the significance of the
project, on the basis of the performed “semantic triples”,
see Franzosi (2010): 139–140.
oPart from the city of Palermo that postponed the
signing of a pact, since local elections were being held at
that time, all metropolitan areas that signed pacts with
the Ministry of Home Affairs complied with their commit-
ment to adopt their own security pact within the limit of
60 days from the signing of the National Pact.
pThe label other refers to an event including adminis-
trators not belonging to the main political parties, based
on data extracted from the Ministerial Registry. This
means not belonging to any of the following categories:
centro-destra, centro-sinistra, centro-destra and centro-
sinistra with contrassegni ufficiali; liste civiche. In detail
(as reported by the Registry and in alphabetical order)
the parties were:
– Alleanza Popolare (ALL. POP.);
– Centro;
– Contadini Monarchici (CM);
– Lista civica (various);
– Lista Civica Indipendente;
– Unione Democratici Cristiani (UDC);– Unione Democratici Cristiani – others;
– Uniti per Cambiare;
– Lega Nord (LN);
– Lega Nord – others.
– Margherita (DL).
The other category also includes the cases not uploaded
on the Ministerial database (reported by the Registry as:
unspecified) and the cases reporting missing and unavail-
able information (see Associazione Openpolis 2014). And
also, the municipalities managed by external commissioners
(reported as: Commissario Prefettizio) at the time of the
signing of a pact.
qThis is the only piece of information made available
by the Registry of Local and Regional Directors. Please
note that, since the time of the signing of a pact, the
political orientation of the local administration might
have changed.
rCapiago Intimiano, Carimate, Cermenate, Cucciago,
Figino Serenza, Novedrate.
sAlzano del Parco, Alzate Brianza, Appiano Gentile,
Arosio, Bregnano, Brenna, Bulgarograsso, Cabiate, Cadorago,
Carbonate, Cantù, Capiago Intimiano, Carimate, Carugo,
Cermenate, Cirimido, Cucciago, Fenegrò, Figino Serenza,
Guanzate, Inverigo, Limido Comasco, Locate Varesino,
Lomazzo, Lurago d’Erba, Lurago Marinone, Mariano
Comense, Monguzzo, Mozzate, Novedrate, Oltrona San
Mamette, Rovellasca, Rovello Porro, Turate, Veniano,
Vertemate con Minoprio.
tAlbiolo, Beregazzo, Binago, Bizzarone, Cagno, Cas-
telnuovo Bozzente, Cavallasca, Drezzo, Faloppio, Giro-
nico, Lurate Caccivio, Olgiate Comasco, Parè, Rodero,
Ronago, Solbiate, Uggiate Trevano, Valmorea.
uBarni, Bellagio, Carlazzo, Blevio, Brunate, Caglio,
Civenna, Faggeto Lario, Lasnigo, Lezzeno, Magreglio, Nesso,
Pognana Lario, Rozzago, Sormano, Torno, Valbrona,
Veleso, Zelbio.
vBene Lario, Cavargna, Corrido, Cusino, Grandola e
Uniti, Menaggio, Plesio, Porlezza, San Bartolomeo Val
Cavargna, San Nazzaro Val Cavargna, San Siro, Valrezzo,
Valsolda.
wArco, Bardolino, Brenzone, Castelnuovo del Garda,
Desenzano, Garda, Gardone Riviera, Gargnano, Lazise,
Limone del Garda, Lonato del Garda, Malcesine, Manerba
del Garda, Molina di Ledro, Moniga del Garda, Nago
Torbole, Padenghe sul Garda, Peschiera del Garda, Riva
del Garda, Salò, San Felice del Benaco, Sirmione, Tignale,
Torri del Benaco, Toscolano Maderno, Tremosine.
xCapraia e Limite, Castelfiorentino, Cerreto Guidi, Cer-
taldo, Empoli, Fucecchio, Gambassi Terme, Montatone,
Montelupo Fiorentino, Montespertoli, Vinci.
yBagno a Ripoli, Calenzano, Campi Bisenzio, Fiesole,
Impruneta, Lastra a Signa, Pontassieve, Scandicci, Sesto
Fiorentino, Signa.
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aaLikely to be connected to the incidence of predatory
crime rates or migratory waves in hot suburbs, or neigh-
bourhoods characterized by urban and/or social decay,
as well as issues related to urban redevelopment.
abOn this matter, see Antonietta Mazzette: “[…] [Ter-
ritorial] governmental policies should be based on an
overall idea of what happens in a certain area, rather than
individual local limited skills. But this means overcoming
strict administrative boundaries and rethinking the terri-
tory as a composite urban system” (Mazzette 2003b: 24,
author translation).
acThe issues related to institutional representation,
moreover, are a long-time concern for the Italian cities,
regardless of their demographic density and their exten-
sion. The issue connected to borders, for instance, is
closely related to the allocation of competences and insti-
tutional responsibility. Also for this reason, many regard
the institutional traditional boundaries as not being ad-
equate any more, and so is the allocation of competencies
among the actors: “[…] the administrative boundaries still
taken into account, have [therefore] become an obstacle
and hinder the most important dynamics taking place on




agUseful to represent the geographical distribution of
wealth.
ahAs a definition of the Gross Domestic Product: “GDP,
and thus GDP per inhabitant, provides a measure of the
total economic activity in a region. It may be used to com-
pare the degree of economic development of regions.
GDP does not measure the income ultimately available to
private households in a region” (Eurostat, 2008: 2, foot-
note 1).
aiThe PPS (purchasing power standard) is an artificial
currency that takes into account differences in national
price levels. This unit allows meaningful volume comparisons
of economic indicators over countries” (Eurostat, 2008:
2, footnote 2).
ajAs reported in Eurostat (2008: 2, footnote 3): “These
data are based on the Nomenclature of Territorial Units
for Statistics (NUTS) as last modified in February 2007.
NUTS 2006 provides a uniform, consistent breakdown of
territorial units for the production of regional statistics for
the EU. Level 2 of the nomenclature has 271 regions:
Belgium (11), Bulgaria (6), the Czech Republic (8),
Denmark (5), Germany (39), Ireland (2), Greece (13), Spain
(19), France (26), Italy (21), Hungary (7), the Netherlands
(12), Austria (9), Poland (16), Portugal (7), Romania (8),
Slovenia (2), Slovakia (4), Finland (5), Sweden (8) and the
United Kingdom (37). Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg and Malta are all considered as single regionsat NUTS 2 level. For a list of the European statistical
regions see: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/
portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction”.
akThe vertical and horizontal line in the figure corre-
sponds to the average values (see Figure 14).
al“In 2007, the GDP per inhabitant in Purchasing
Power Standards (PPS) terms, in EU 27, ranged between
26% of the EU-27 average in the region of Severozapa-
den (Bulgaria), and 334% of the average of Inner London
(UK)” (Eurostat 2008: 1).
amThis particular measure seems to be the most suitable
to understand the quality of life and the levels of economic
development in a specific area, compared with the GDP
value that focuses too much on the economic wealth
produced.
anThe vertical and horizontal line in the figure corre-
sponds to the average values (see Figure 15).
aoThis is due to the fact that Italia Oggi (2007) does not
make any distinction between the South and the Islands,
including both in the same category.
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